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We find that emerging markets appeared to be somewhat insulated from developments in U.S. financial
markets from early 2007 to summer 2008. From that point on, however, emerging markets responded
very strongly to the deteriorating situation in the U.S. financial system and real economy. Policy measures
taken in emerging markets to insulate themselves from global financial developments proved inadequate
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In this paper we evaluate the transmission of the U.S. subprime crisis to emerging 
markets. Our interest in this topic is partly related to the widespread view that prior to the 
current crisis many emerging market countries had undertaken reforms that were 
designed to, and would in fact, insulate them from adverse shocks from the rest of the 
world.  These policies included substantial increases in reserve assets and substantial 
reductions in net government debt.  Moreover the currency exposure of EM governments 
was reduced in some cases to long dollar positions, commercial bank net foreign 
exchange borrowings were strictly limited and nonfinancial firms foreign currency debt 
was monitored and, in many cases, strictly controlled.  Finally, emerging markets were 
generally experiencing current account and primary fiscal surpluses.   
 
As recently as October 2008 the Mexican government argued forcefully that the Mexican 
economy was sufficiently insulated from the U.S. to get through the crisis without a 
significant recession.
1  More generally, the view that the emerging financial markets 
would not be directly affected by the subprime crisis suggested that growth in China and 
other emerging markets would carry the world economy for several years while the 
United States and Europe recovered.
2  These hopes evaporated quickly by fall 2008 and 
the question is did something about the U.S. crisis change or was the decoupling 
hypothesis too optimistic from the outset? 
 
We address these questions empirically in several ways. In the next section we provide an 
informal narrative of the when, how and why emerging markets responded to the U.S. 
subprime financial crisis. In this section we distinguish three phases of the financial crisis 
transmission to emerging markets. We argue that emerging market asset prices were 
largely insulated or decoupled from the crisis for some months, but then fell even harder 
than prices for US assets as expectations about GDP growth in the United States and 
other industrial countries deteriorated in the summer of 2008.  Finally, the Lehman 
bankruptcy in September 2008 generated a very direct financial shock to emerging 
                                                 
1 Carstins (2008) 
2 Bergsten (2008), IMF (2008).   2
markets as trade credit evaporated and international trade declined sharply and uniformly 
around the world.  In section 3 we analyze formally how U.S. subprime “news” 
transmitted to CDS spreads in emerging markets
3. We are interested in the types of 
“news” that moved CDS spreads, how common was the reaction across emerging 
markets, and in the magnitude of the response.
4 We identify events that others have 
claimed were important sources of information about the nature and intensity of the crisis 
for U.S. markets.  We use one official data source (time line for important events 
published by the Federal Reserve Bank of Saint Louis) and one market source (timeline 
for events published by Bloomberg) for these events. We distill these very detailed data 
sets into a set of 15 types of events that were thought to influence expectations in U.S. 
markets.  Using a regression “event study” approach, we test whether these U.S. events 
were important in the evolution of debt (CDS spreads) in 14 selected emerging markets, 
if there was a common reaction across emerging markets, and the size of the response.  
 
Our event study finds that a range of financial and real economic news emanating from 
the US has statistically and economically large impacts on emerging markets and several 
news events uniformly moved markets. However, it is not clear whether the structural 
linkages between the U.S. and emerging markets have changed or whether the frequency, 
importance and magnitude of the events emanating from the U.S. have changed. To 
address this “decoupling-recoupling” issue, in section 4 we review developments in 
selected equity, debt and foreign exchange markets for a sample of emerging market 
countries during the three phases of the financial crisis identified in our narrative 
description (beginning of 2007 through February 2009). This analysis focuses on the 
                                                 
3 Credit-default swaps protect bondholders against default by paying the buyer face value in exchange for 
the underlying securities or the cash equivalent should a borrower fail to adhere to its debt agreements. The 
contracts rise as perceptions of credit quality deteriorate and a basis point is worth $1,000 on a contract 
protecting $10 million of debt.  
 
4 Eichengreen et al. (2009), in a related study, investigate the common factors influencing international 
bank CDS spreads during different phases of the subprime crisis. They find that the importance of common 
factors rose substantially after the outbreak of the subprime crisis. They employ principal component time-
series analysis rather than focus on news announcements emanating from the U.S. as in our event study. 
Longstaff et al. (2007)  also finds that EM CDS spreads can mostly be explained by a global factor over the 
2000-2007 period.    3
timing of changes in these markets during the financial crisis for selected emerging 
markets relative to the U.S. and compares market dynamics. In section 5 we further 
address whether linkages changed or whether the frequency and magnitude of the shocks 
emanating from the U.S. changed. We focus on one emerging market with especially 
strong linkages with the U.S. economy—Mexico—and investigate the transmission of 
disturbances between equity markets and how they’ve changed between the different 
phases of the financial crisis. We conclude our discussion in section 6.  
 
Our conclusion is that there is some support for the decoupling hypothesis through mid 
2008.  But as expectations for a severe downturn in economic activity in the U.S. and 
Europe took hold and early warnings about the effects on world trade volumes took 
center stage, financial markets recoupled dramatically.  Looking forward there is some 
support for the idea that emerging markets remain better prepared for less violent 
financial shocks from the rest of the world.  Moreover it seems to us likely that they will 
redouble their efforts to insure against shocks. 
 
2. Three Phases of the Subprime Crisis 
 
In this section we provide an informal narrative of three phases of the transmission of the 
subprime crisis to the emerging markets. During the whole period reviewed, February 
2007 to March 2009, cumulative losses in the dollar or domestic currency values of 
emerging markets’ debt and equity market were remarkably similar to those in industrial 
countries.  But there are interesting differences in the relative behavior of emerging 
markets’ assets within the crisis period.    
 
The 18 months from February 2007 to May 19, 2008, appear to have been a brief golden 
age of a decoupling of emerging markets from industrial countries.  During this first 
phase of the U.S. subprime crisis EM equity markets outperformed the broad U.S. equity 
indices by about 40% (Chart 1).   During this interval EM currencies appreciated against 
the dollar by about 10 percent and so accounted for about one quarter of EM equities 
outperformance.   4
 
As discussed at length in other papers in this volume, several EM currencies were 
supported by the carry trade as investors chased high yields in emerging markets.  
Nevertheless, it is clear that investors did not expect the financial difficulties unfolding in 
the U.S. and Europe to have a negative impact on dollar earnings in emerging markets 
nor did they apply a higher discount rate to those earnings. This was a remarkable 
performance for countries where collapse of equity values and sovereign defaults had 
been the usual response to credit crunches in industrial countries.   
 
This does not mean that important events in the U.S. and other industrial countries did 
not affect emerging markets.  Quite the contrary, as we show in detail below, day-to-day 
movements and volatility of emerging debt and equity markets were strongly related to 
developments in the United States and Europe.  Nevertheless it is clear that in its early 
stages the subprime crisis had much less influence on the outlook for economic 
performance in emerging markets relative to the United States and other industrial 
countries.  
 
The relative performance of credit markets in the U.S. and emerging markets during 
phase one tells a similar story.  As shown in Chart 2, CDX EM, an index of credit default 
spreads for emerging market sovereign bonds, declined steadily during 2007 before rising 
in early 2008.  EM spreads declined on balance during phase one.  Spreads on an index of 
US investment grade corporate bonds over benchmark Treasuries were little changed 
during 2007 but rose by about the same amount as EM spreads in early 2008.  Perhaps 
the important thing to take away from this experience is that neither of these credit 
markets seemed to reflect expectations that the subprime crisis would have a negative 
impact on default rates for U.S. or EM bond markets until early 2008.  Moreover, in 2007 
as EM currencies appreciated and EM central banks accumulated international reserves it 
seemed increasingly unlikely that sovereign bonds were vulnerable to default risk. 
 
   5
Phase 2 is much shorter than phase one, from May 19, 2008 to “Lehman Day,” 
September 15, 2008.  Over this interval the EM equity index shown in Chart 2 fell from 
165 to 109 giving up three quarters of its outperformance relative to the U.S. equity index 
accumulated over phase one. As in phase 1, the decline in the domestic currency value of 
the EM index was reinforced by a decline in the value of EM currencies relative to the 
U.S. dollar.   
 
A remarkable feature of this phase of the crisis was the apparent “decoupling” of credit 
and equity markets.  As shown in Chart 2, spreads in EM and U.S. markets widened in 
phase 2 but, in contrast to equity markets, the deterioration in credit markets was very 
similar in magnitude.   
 
Clearly something important changed several months before the Lehman bankruptcy sent 
all the markets into a new panic.  The events that generated this very different intensity of 
sell offs are not easy to pinpoint.  Nevertheless we think a good case can be made for the 
idea that this critical three-month interval leading up to Lehman was dominated by 
revised expectations about the real effects the crisis would have on output in industrial 
countries and emerging markets.   
 
A remarkable feature of the macro data for the U.S. during phase 2 is that it gave no hint 
that a disaster was just around the corner.  High frequency data for U.S. economic 
activity such as industrial production, exports and retail sales did not turn down until after 
the Lehman disaster in September.  While there were several prophets of doom for the 
U.S. real economy, the experts’ consensus forecast for the fourth quarter of 2008 and 
2009 declined only by a few tenths during phase 2.  The IMF’s forecast for world 
economic activity that was published in October still called for world GPP growth of 6% 
for all of 2009. 
 
There were, however, two sources of early warnings -- both of which were probably 
responding to the same shift in expectations.  First, commodity and oil prices also turned 
down sharply at the beginning of phase two.  The fall in oil prices was good for some   6
EMs and bad for others but we can probably relate the break in the oil market to changes 
in the outlook for world economic activity.  The downturn in commodity prices was 
probably related to the same reduction in the outlook for world GDP growth and is 
clearly bad for EM equity and exchange rates.   
 
Second, the similar increase in default spreads both in the U.S. and in emerging markets 
in phase 2 probably reflected expectations that what had to that point been a financial 
crisis in the U.S. and Europe could also turn into a long and deep decline in economic 
activity.  The admission of the Federal Reserve on August 17 that “the downside risks to 
growth have increased appreciably” was an important and probably delayed 
acknowledgment of this shift in expectations.      
 
Our interpretation of phase one and two is that during phase one emerging markets were 
plausibly decoupled from the financial crisis that was developing in the U.S. and Europe.  
EM banks held very little subprime exposure and in most cases recent crises had led to 
very strict regulation of their banking systems.  But in phase 2 there was no plausible 
reason to believe that emerging markets had decoupled from a potential collapse in 
economic activity in the U.S. and other industrial countries.   
 
From Lehman Day to year end 2008, EM and U.S. equity markets fell together to levels 
forty percent below their pre-crisis levels. During this third phase of the crisis EM 
currencies also declined by about ten percent.  EM and US credit spreads increased very 
sharply after September and by late October had reached crisis levels.   
 
As discussed elsewhere in this issue, phase 3 was largely unanticipated and quite 
different as compared to phases one or two or any previous historical experience.  In 
particular, the freezing of credit markets that reached crisis proportions with runs on U.S. 
money market funds in late October appears to have had a direct effect on EM domestic 
credit markets.  Anecdotal evidence strongly suggests that this freeze included   7
international trade financing.
5  The contraction of world trade after September 2008 was 
remarkable both for its severity and for its uniformity across developed and emerging 
markets.  Most countries saw a decline in both imports and exports of about 30% from 
September 2008 to January 2009.   
 
One plausible explanation is that in the post-Lehman phase even trade credit to support 
exports and imports was disrupted by the counter party risk and deleveraging generated 
by the bankruptcy of a major player in international credit markets.  If this was indeed the 
case then the third phase of the crisis was a spectacular recoupling of financial markets in 
the U.S. and emerging markets.  An optimistic interpretation of developments in 2009 is 
that as U.S. financial markets have unfrozen there is some hope that recovery of world 
trade will support economic recovery programs in industrial countries and emerging 
markets.    
 
3. Transmission of U.S. Real and Financial Shocks to Emerging Markets 
 
We now turn to daily data for news from the United States and debt, equity and exchange 
rates in emerging markets.  In this section we focus on daily CDS spreads (5-year 
sovereign bonds) in 14 selected emerging markets, and regress changes in these spreads 
on a host of financial, real and political news announcements that have emanated from 
the U.S. since the beginning of 2007 through early 2009. Our objective is to evaluate 
which types of announcements have the most effect on emerging markets, evaluate the 




CDS Spreads in Emerging Markets  
 
                                                 
5 The link between trade credit and trade during the subprime and previous financial crises is far from clear.  
We consider this a plausible conjecture.  See IMF  (2003), Auboin and Moritz Meier-Ewert (2008).   8
Our objective is to evaluate how financial markets in emerging markets respond to U.S. 
news during a period of intense financial turmoil. To this end, we consider fourteen 
emerging markets geographically distributed across the world: five emerging markets in 
Latin America (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia and Mexico), three in Asia (China, 
South Korea and Malaysia), four in central Europe (Czech Republic, Poland and 
Hungary) and three from other regions (Russia, South Africa and Turkey). This group of 
countries provides a broad geographic representation of emerging markets, with a range 
of levels of economic development and financial depth.  
 
We focus on 5-year CDS spreads on sovereign bonds over the sample period, January 1, 
2007 – February 19, 2009. All of the countries in our sample have consistent CDS series 
over this time period. The CDS spreads are shown in Chart 4 and discussed further in 
Section 4.  
 
U.S. Financial and Real “News” Events 
 
Our other key data component is U.S. “news” events. For the purposes of this study it is 
important that we capture major news announcements emanating primarily from the U.S. 
market and test which of these events transmit to emerging markets. We want to cast our 
net widely over a broad set of news announcements but no so widely as to include events 
of marginally important information value.   
 
We consider the Bloomberg news announcements on the U.S. economy and the financial 
crisis as well as the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis’s comprehensive time line on 
developments on the financial crisis. We code these news announcements into fifteen 
categories: bankruptcies (BR), write-downs (WD), credit events (CRD), Federal Reserve 
swaps with developed economies (FSD), Federal Reserve swaps with emerging markets 
(FSE), direct housing market policy actions (HD), Lehman Brother Bankruptcy 
(LEHMAN), major U.S. political developments (POL), recapitalization of financial 
institutions (REC), the decision by Treasury Secretary Paulson not to use the Troubled 
Asset Recovery Program to purchase mortgage-related securities (TARP_CANCEL),   9
events and programs substantially expanding the U.S. Treasury’s balance sheet (TBS), 
events and programs substantially expanding the Federal Reserve’s balance sheet (FBS), 
new regulatory actions (REG), positive economic developments in the U.S. 
(REALPLUS) and negative economic developments in the U.S. (REALMINUS).  
 
Table 1 gives a more detailed explanation of the description and coding of the events as 
well as illustrative examples of events included in each category. Table 2 shows the 
number of events in each category for the full sample (total number of events) and for 
two sub-sample periods—the combined first and second phases of financial problems that 
emerged in the U.S but had a limited effect on emerging markets (January 2007 through 
August 2008) and the third phase of very intense financial problems in emerging markets 
(September 2008 – February 2009). Not surprisingly, the great majority of events 
occurred in the third and final phase. 
 
B. Methodology and Results  
 
The dependent variable that we wish to explain is the daily change in the CDS spread for 
each emerging market of our sample. Unit root tests suggest that the change in the CDS 
spread is a stationary variable. In addition to the “news” variables and a constant, we also 
include a lagged dependent variable to effectively absorb residual autocorrelation in the 
equation. The sample period was January 1, 2007 to January 19, 2009, giving a common 
sample of 533 observations except for the central European countries where the sample is 
more limited due to data constraints on reported CDS spreads. A regression methodology 
(OLS) is employed.   
 
Table 3 presents the results of the regression analysis. The adjusted R-square ranges from 
a low of 0.04 (Argentina) to a high of 0.41 (South Korea). The mean of the dependent 
variable (average daily increase in the CDS spread over the sample period) ranges from 
lows of around 0.34-0.35 (China and Chile, respectively) to highs of around 1.26-6.25 
(Russia and Argentina, respectively). The coefficients in bold represent significance   10
levels at 90% or higher (‘***’ denotes 99% level of significance or higher; ‘**’ denotes 
95% level; ‘*’ denotes 90% level).  
 
Our sample consists of a very diverse set of emerging market economies with a variety of 
idiosyncratic economic and political developments influencing CDS spreads and with 
quite different degrees of financial linkages with U.S. markets. Nonetheless, the 
transmission of news announcements to these markets was rapid and there are several 
factors that affected CDS markets almost uniformly. One event that was common to all 
emerging markets in our sample was Lehman Brothers bankruptcy (LEHMAN) news and 
associated announcements. LEHMAN is associated with four news announcements in the 
sample. Each LEHMAN announcement (on average) raised CDS immediately by 
between 7 basis points (China) to over 100 basis points (Argentina), with all 14 countries 
being significantly affected. China and Chile were the least affected, and Argentina and 
Russia were the most affected.  
 
Write downs of equity (WD) in U.S. financial institutions, housing market developments 
in the U.S. (HD) and the cancellation of the TARP plan to purchase mortgage-related 
securities also were important factors that systemically raised CDS spreads. WD news 
adversely affected CDS markets (rise in spreads) in all 14 countries and the effect was 
statistically significant in 10 cases. HD news adversely affected CDS spreads in all 14 
countries (statistically significant in 7 cases). TARP_CANCEL news also adversely 
affected emerging market CDS spreads in 13 of 14 cases, with Argentina as the outlier, of 
which the coefficients in 9 countries are statistically significant.  
 
On the positive side, announcements of the two Federal Reserve swap arrangements with 
emerging markets (FSE) and developed countries (FSD), as well as positive real-side 
developments in the U.S. economy had the effect of lowering CDS spreads. In particular, 
FSE announcements significantly lowered CDS spreads in 13 of the 14 countries (with 
Argentina as the exception). The drop in CDS spreads ranged from 22 basis points in 
Chile and the Czech Republic to a drop of 183 basis points in South Korea. Results are 
similar with FSD. Positive real-side economic developments in the U.S. (REALPLUS)   11
are also associated with lower CDS spreads in emerging markets in 13 instances, of 
which 7 coefficients are statistically significant. Argentina is again the exception. 
 
Three types of news announcements in the U.S. which surprisingly did not uniformly 
play a role in emerging market CDS spreads were major policy actions taken by the U.S. 
Treasury and Federal Reserve to shore up the financial system (TBS, FBS and REG). 
These events attracted much news attention but did not generally transmit to emerging 
markets. In particular, CDS spreads in only three of the eleven countries were 
significantly reduced by TBS announcements (Brazil, Mexico and Turkey). Surprisingly, 
CDS spreads  rose significantly in response to FBS announcements in China and 
Malaysia-- presumably providing bad news to the market about the extent of the liquidity 
problems facing U.S. banks and credit markets rather than good news about the Fed 
program-- and were not significantly affected elsewhere.
6 Similarly, important changes in 
financial system regulations (REG) lowered spreads significantly in only one case (Chile) 
and significantly raised spreads in four cases. 
7  
 
On balance, news about the financial crisis and real economic activity emanating from 
the U.S. have played a significant role in moving CDS spreads in emerging markets. A 
series of write-downs, reported losses and downgrades of U.S. financial institutions, as 
well as the Lehman bankruptcy announcement, caused significant jumps in the CDS 
spreads, while positive news announcements on real economic activity in the U.S. 
buoyed emerging markets and lowered spreads.  The critical policy developments moving 
these spreads downward have been a series of news announcements of foreign exchange 
swap agreements with emerging markets. But the major program announcements by the 
Treasury, Federal Reserve and other U.S. government agencies, including increases in 
deposit insurance coverage, the Fed’s commercial paper funding facility (CPFF), the 
FDIC’s new Temporary Liquidity Guarantee Program and dozens of other 
                                                 
6 Taylor and Williams (2008a,b) also do not find robust evidence of a significant negative effect of the 
Fed’s term auction facility (TAF) on term inter-bank lending rates.  
7 It is possible that official policy announcements were anticipated by the markets and therefore did not 
have a systemic contemporaneous impact. Other “news” announcements were largely unanticipated.    12
announcements supporting the financial system, did little to reduce CDS spreads in 
emerging markets.  
 
4. Market Dynamics: Emerging Markets in the Financial Crisis 
 
The preceding section demonstrated that news events from the U.S. have had large 
impacts on CDS spreads in emerging markets, effectively transmitting the financial crisis 
in the U.S. to markets abroad. It is not clear, however, whether the channels of 
transmission are stronger or whether the frequency, nature and import of the U.S. shocks 
has changed around mid-year 2008. Further insights on this issue may be gained by 
evaluating the dynamics of financial market changes in emerging markets, and the 




The behavior of levels of broad stock indices is shown in Chart 3. National stock indices 
are shown in each panel together with the U.S. Standard and Poor’s 500 index. The 
indices are local currency values normalized so each series starts at a base equal to one on 
February 27, 2007. To provide perspective on the timing of some key events in the U.S., 
we again mark three dates in the chart (denoted by vertical lines) that separates the three 
phases of the subprime crisis: May 19, 2008 and September 15, 2008 (Lehman 
bankruptcy). The first phase of the subprime crisis runs from February 27, 2007 to May 
18, 2008; the second phase runs from May 19, 2008 to September 14, 2008; and the third 
phase runs from September 15, 2008 to February 2009.  
 
As discussed in the introduction three features of this data stand out.  First, the start of the 
subprime crisis in mid 2007 is also the start of a long but gentle decline in U.S. equities 
through September 2008.  A spectacular decline in September is then followed by 
extreme volatility since then but no clear trend.  In contrast most of the emerging markets 
had recovered by August 2007 and continued to perform quite well for another 12-14 
months.  This is true across regions and for emerging markets that are quite different in   13
terms of economic structure.  If there was a time when decoupling seemed a reasonable 
idea it was during this year-long interval.  
 
An interesting exception is Argentina.  Argentina depends on foreign trade but is largely 
closed to international capital flows.  Yet of all the countries in our sample it moved most 
closely with the United States.  An intriguing possibility is that countries are linked 
through trade but open capital markets allow or generate different dynamics across 
countries.    
 
Second, in late May 2008, the equity markets again start to move together.  In the next 
section we will show that this was associated with increasing expectations that the 
decline in economic activity would be much larger than had been anticipated.  This close 
relationship is even more pronounced in mid September when the Lehman crisis proceeds 
a spectacular fall in all the markets through mid October.  In the next section we will look 
for news associated with these broad trends but for now it seems clear that something 
important occurred in June-July 2008 and again in September 2008.   
 
Finally in the first three months of this year extreme volatility continues and markets 
have moved together but with no clear trend as of this writing.   
 
In terms of the net move over the whole time period there does not seem to be any 
pattern.  If we look at the whole sample, Brazil and China outperform the U.S. by 
substantial margins. The volatility of equity prices is much higher for Brazil and China as 
compared to the U.S. and, as we discuss in more detail below, the day-to-day correlation 
for Brazil is quite high and for China quite low.  Can we draw any conclusions about the 
interdependence of these markets?  It could be argued that Brazil and China are 
completely integrated with the U.S. market and subject to the same shocks but are more 
volatile.  Clearly if this pattern was reliable it would be trivial to mimic any market by 
another by adjusting the leverage to increase or reduce volatility.    
   14
One additional summary statistic useful for shedding light on this issue is correlations 
between price movements (percentage changes) in these markets, and how they’ve 
changed over time
8. Table 4 presents correlations between (percent changes) in the U.S. 
SP500 and (percentage changes) in national equity markets for selected emerging 
markets for the three phases of the subprime crisis. The last two columns of the table 
show the difference (percentage change) in the correlation between the second and third 
phases. 
 
Correlations increased markedly between the second and third phases of the crisis (from 
September 15 onwards) for most emerging markets (11 of 14), indicating stronger 
linkages between the markets or more common shocks. (The correlation decreased in two 
countries, Korea and Malaysia, and was unchanged in Russia). For example, the 
correlation with Colombia, Turkey and Poland jumped 210%, 115% and 103%, 
respectively, at the high end of the spectrum.  The correlation with Argentina, Brazil and 
Hungary also rose by very substantial amounts (38% or higher). Surprisingly, the 
correlation with the Asian countries in the sample (China, Korea and Malaysia) was 
either unchanged or fell slightly between the second and third phases of the crisis, 
suggesting greater insulation.  Overall, however, changes in the correlations confirm our 
observations from the charts that the linkages generally increased substantially after mid-




Chart 4 shows daily credit default spreads for the U.S. and selected emerging markets.  
The similarity of the changes and timing in the CDS spreads across emerging markets 
over the period is remarkable.  Also there was almost no movement in CDS spreads until 
the Lehman failure.  Only in a very tough environment would governments be expected 
to default.  Clearly the Lehman bankruptcy was a different kind of problem and it was 
transmitted across all kind of countries in remarkably similar ways. 
                                                 
8 There are statistical problems in interpreting correlations of financial data when volatility is changing over 
time. We view these correlations as a descriptive statistic supplementing our other measures of linkages 
over the three phases of the subprime crisis.    15
 
Volatility also appears to take a distinct shift upwards starting around mid-September  
2008 (phase 3). Again, the same pattern of initial decoupling from the bad financial news 
emanating from the U.S. is evident until late summer 2008. However, hopes that 
emerging markets were decoupled from the financial crisis and that their economies 




Exchange rate developments for selected emerging markets (Mexico, Argentina and 
Russia) are shown in Chart 5. Exchange rates follow a similar general pattern to equity 
prices in that they generally appreciated relative to the dollar, at times rapidly, until 
summer 2008 and then depreciated very sharply. Emerging markets on balance appeared 
to be initially decoupled from the U.S. financial crisis and then experienced large 
depreciations that greatly exceeded the initial appreciations of their currencies from early 
2007 though mid-2008.  Russia, for example, started 2007 trading at above 26 rubles per 
dollar, appreciated to 23 rubles per dollar by June 2008 and then started to depreciate, 
reaching almost 34 rubles per dollar by February 2009. Mexico followed a very similar 
pattern to Russia: peso appreciation from January 2007 to August 2008, followed by a 
sharp depreciation from September 2008 to February 2009. Argentina was trading 
between 3.1-3.2 pesos per dollar from May 2007 to May 2008, followed by several 
months of strong appreciation and then a sharp depreciation beginning in September 
2008. By February 2009 the Argentine currency had depreciated markedly and was 
trading close to 3.5 pesos per dollar. 
 
5. Linkages: More News or Decoupling-Recoupling? 
 
The preceding empirical analysis demonstrates that some U.S. news significantly moved 
CDS spreads in selected emerging markets. How does this empirical finding fit with the 
graphical analysis indicating that emerging markets were seemingly decoupled for a 
number of months from the adverse developments in the U.S. market, and suddenly were 
moving in tandem with U.S. markets from early fall 2008 to early 2009 (phase 3)? Two   16
candidate explanations are (1) the decoupling-recoupling linkage explanation, suggesting 
that market forces were moving these markets apart for the early part of the sample 
(phases 1 and 2) and then linkages reemerged in the latter part (phase 3) of the sample; or 
(2) news announcements emanating from the U.S. were more frequent, and were more 
important for emerging markets in the later sample compared to the early sample.  
 
These are not necessarily competing hypotheses. Clearly, the worst financial and 
economic news emanating from the U.S. was concentrated in the period from early fall  
2008 (post-Lehman) onwards. However, it also appears that emerging markets were more 
sensitive to U.S. news announcements in the latter part of the sample. To shed further 
light on the decoupling hypothesis, we investigate the linkage between the U.S. equity 
market and the Mexican equity market.
9 We investigate how these markets are linked 
using a simple VAR model, Granger-causality tests and impulse response functions for 
the two sub-sample periods. Differences in the estimates between the two periods, 1/07 to 
8/08 for the early period (phases 1 and 2) and 9/08 to 2/09 for the late period (phase 3), 
should highlight differences in the responsiveness of daily percent changes in Mexican 
equity prices and daily percent changes in U.S. equity prices.  
 
We employ a simple bivariate VAR model with U.S. and Mexican equity prices and three 
lagged values. Equity prices are in log first differences to ensure that stationary series are 
employed in the VAR model. Three lags are indicated by most of the lag length statistical 
tests shown in Table 5. Table 6 shows part of the Granger causality tests for each sample 
period, namely the effect of lagged percent changes in U.S. equity prices (SP500) on 
percent changes in Mexican equity prices. The upper panel shows the full sample period 
(all three phases of the subprime crisis), the middle panel shows phases 1 and 2 of the 
crisis and lower panel shows phase 3 of the crisis.  
 
The Granger causality results for the full sample (upper panel) indicate a strong linkage 
between the U.S. equity market and the Mexican equity market. The null hypothesis that 
                                                 
9 One empirical approach would be to divide our sample into two parts and test for structural change in the 
responsiveness of emerging markets to news emanating from the U.S. We cannot follow this approach, 
however, due to the relative paucity of news announcements in the first sub-sample period.   17
U.S. equity prices do not “Granger cause” Mexican equity prices is rejected at the 1% 
level. This simply means that lagged values of the U.S. equity prices are a good leading 
indicator of Mexican equity prices (in percentage changes) over the full sample. In the 
early sample period representing phases 1 and 2 of the crisis, by contrast, U.S. equity 
prices add no (statistically significant) information in predicting Mexican equity prices. 
Phase 3 of the crisis suggests that U.S. equity prices are marginally significant (12% level 
of significance) predictors of Mexican equity prices. There appears to be more 
information available over the full sample period to make the judgment that U.S. equities 
are a good leading indicator of Mexican equities, but this information appears to be 
derived mainly from the period encompassing the third phase of the crisis (post-Lehman). 
This again provides some evidence of the “decoupling” hypothesis for phases 1 and 2 of 
the crisis with linkages reemerging during the third phase of the crisis.  
 
This observation is supported by impulse response functions derived from the 3-lag 
bivariate VAR model which underlie the Granger causality results of Table 6. The 
impulse response functions are reported in Chart 6. These are based on a Choleski 
decomposition of the VAR residuals and a shock of one standard deviation. The dashed 
lines represent confidence intervals (+/- 2 standard errors) around the impulse response. 
A 10-day period is investigated and the accumulated response is reported since the model 
is estimated in percent changes. The accumulated response gives the accumulated percent 
change in Mexican equity prices from a shock in U.S. equity prices. The upper panel 
shows the impulse response from the full sample period, the middle panel shows the 
impulse response from phases 1 and 2, and the lower panel shows the impulse response 
from phase 3.  
 
Not surprisingly, the impulse responses derived from estimating the model over the three 
sample periods are consistent with the Granger causality results. The impulse response 
from the full sample shows a significant positive response from U.S. equity prices to the 
Mexican market. A 2 percent positive shock (one standard deviation) in the U.S. market 
causes an impact effect of about 1.5 percent in the Mexican market, falling off to about 
1.3 percent after a few days. During phases 1 and 2 of the crisis, by contrast, the impact   18
effect is much less and stabilizes at about 0.9 percent. The response is largest in phase 3 
with an impact effect of 2.5 percent, stabilizing at about 2.0 percent after a few days. 
 
In sum, the Granger causality results and the impulse response functions indicate that 
Mexico has been more closely linked with the U.S. market since fall 2008 than 
previously. The Mexican equity market is closely linked with the U.S. market and 
integrated with the U.S. economy and may not be representative of the broader group of 
emerging markets. Nonetheless, the results are suggestive and provide support for the 




Our review of the financial indicators lends support to the view that markets were 
decoupled from the U.S. for a period of time, but linkages dramatically reemerged 
(recoupled) by late summer or early fall 2008, with a remarkably uniform timing across 
most emerging markets. Volatility also rose dramatically starting in fall 2008. Simple 
correlations between (percent) price changes in the U.S. equity market (SP500) and those 
in emerging markets also show an increase after August 2008, oftentimes substantially 
so, in 9 of the 11 selected emerging markets investigated.  
 
It is clear that U.S. financial and real news transmitted strongly to emerging markets over 
the whole sample period, as reflected in 5-year CDS spreads on sovereign bonds. We 
identified a wide set of U.S. news announcements such as write-downs of financial 
institutions and news on the U.S. real economy that systemically moved CDS spreads in 
most emerging markets. We also identified several types of news announcements, such as 
the Lehman bankruptcy and swap arrangements, that had uniformly large effects across 
all of the emerging markets in our sample. By contrast, major news announcements by 
the Federal Reserve and U.S. Treasury on plans to stabilize the U.S. financial system had 
little effect on emerging market CDS spreads.  
   19
But has this responsiveness changed since fall 2008? We can not investigate this issue 
using news announcements since there is a relative paucity of news in the early part of 
the sample. Rather, we consider the linkages between U.S. equity markets and the equity 
market in one emerging market—Mexico—with close financial and economic ties with 
the U.S. Using VAR methods, we find that the linkages between these two equity 
markets have become much stronger since fall 2008 when the U.S. financial crisis grew 
to critical proportions.  
 
On balance, we find evidence for the decoupling-recoupling hypothesis. Using several 
approaches to investigate this issue, we find that emerging markets appeared to be largely 
insulated and decoupled from developments in U.S. financial markets from early 2007 to 
summer 2008. From that point on, however, emerging markets responded very strongly 
to the deteriorating situation in the U.S. financial system and real economy. Policy 
measures taken in emerging markets to insulate themselves from global financial 
developments proved inadequate in the face of strong international recoupling of the 
international financial system.    
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Table1 : Variable Definitions and Example of Events 
Event Variable  Definition of Event  Event Example: Date and Description  
REG  Important changes in US 
financial regulations 
3-Dec-08 
SEC approves measures to increase transparenc
and accountability at credit rating agencies. 
TBS 
Policy announcements 
that will affect the US 
Treasury’s balance sheet 
5-Dec-08 
Treasury purchases $4 billion in preferred stock in
US banks under the Capital Purchase Program. 
REALMINUS  Negative news about US 
growth 
11-Dec-08 
NBER announces that the economic activity peak
in December 2007 and that the economy has sinc
been in recession. 
REALPLUS  Positive news about US 
growth 
11-Dec-08 
House approves $14 billion automaker bailout. 
FBS 
Policy announcements 












Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac announce that they
suspend mortgage foreclosures until January 200
CRD  Adverse news from US 
credit markets 
9-Jan-09 
US consumer borrowing falls by record $7.9 billio
credit freeze deepens. 
REC 
Announcement of 
recapitalization of US 
financial institutions 
10-Oct-08 
GE raises $15 billion; Buffett invests $5 billion in 
preferred shares and warrants. 
BR 
Bankruptcy or forced 
merger of US financial 
institutions 
25-Sep-08 
Washington Mutual seized by FDIC, JPMorgan bu
its deposits. 
WD 
Announcements of write 
downs of US financial 
institutions assets 
6-May-08 
Fannie May reports Q1 loss of $2.19 billion. 
FSD 
Expansion of Federal 
Reserve Swap lines to 
industrial countries 
13-Oct-08 
Fed lets European Central banks offer unlimited 
dollars, removes swap limits. 
FSE 
Expansion of Federal 
Reserve Swap lines with 
emerging markets 
29-Oct-08 
The FOMC establishes swap lines with Banco Ce
do Brazil, Banco de Mexico Bank of Korea, and th
Monetary Authority of Singapore for up to $30 bill
each. 
POL  Political developments in 
US 
29-Sep-08 
Rescue plan rejected. 
LEHMAN Lehman  Brothers  15-Sep-08 
Lehman Brothers declares bankruptcy. 
TARP_CANCEL  Troubled Assets Relief 
Program 
12-Nov-08 
Treasury Secretary Paulson announces that the 
Treasury has decided not to use TARP funds to b
mortgage related assets. 
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Table 2: Number of “News” Events Emanating from the U.S.  
Number of Events During Phases of the Subprime Crisis 
Event 
Phases 1 and 2  Phase 3  Full Sample       
(Total Events) 
January 2007–







      
REG   4  12  16 
      
TBS   5  25  30 
      
REALMINUS   1  28  29 
      
REALPLUS 2  6  8 
      
FBS 11  13  24 
      
HD 0  4  4 
      
CRD 0  5  5 
      
REC 13  18  31 
      
BR 16  14  30 
      
WD 34  12  46 
      
FSD 0  8  8 
        
FSE 0  2  2 
      
POL 0  2  2 
      
LEHMAN 0 4  4 
      
TARP_CANCEL 0  1  1 
           











Table 3: Response of Emerging Market CDS Spreads to U.S. Events  
Variable Argentina  Brazil    Chile   Colombia  Mexico  
C  2.74 0.05  0.18 0.24 0.31 
D(CDS5Y(-1))  0.12*** 0.29***  0.25*** 0.24*** 0.29*** 
BR -18.56  -0.77  -0.97  -2.44  -2.98 
WD 15.41  6.63*** 2.04**  6.12***  7.41*** 
CRD  75.72** 11.19*  -7.82**  5.91 7.15 
FSD -44.33  -31.62***  -4.29  -32.37*** -29.65*** 
FSE  112.01* -57.78***  -22.48***  -33.78** -44.31*** 
HD  101.80**  11.4  12.58***  12.06 14.21 
LEHMAN  100.99*** 32.73***  8.11**  25.62***  29.09*** 
POL -3.16  19.65**  -6.15 15.75 14.19 
REC 8.07  2.05  -0.01  1.66  -1.036 
TARP_CANCEL  -126.32* 63.47*** 13.80*  63.76*** 66.43*** 
TBS 2.047  -8.48***  0.28 -3.22  -8.07** 
FBS 19.94  1.57  0.44  -0.93  0.31 
REG -26.69  -1  -3.81**  -3.14 1.52 
REALPLUS 38.73  -11.04** -8.28*** -15.83*** -13.04** 
REALMINUS 0.42  1.74  3.87***  2.1 2.78 
 
Observations  533 533  534 533 533 
Adjusted R-squared  0.043  0.258 0.13  0.16  0.2 
S.E. of regression  67.035  14.87  7.18  14.6  13.95 
Mean depend. Var  6.245  0.43  0.35  0.41  0.54 
Log  likelihood  -2989 -2106  -1763 -2176 -2152 
Durbin-Watson stat  2.08  2.07 1.99  2.09  2.04 
Notes:  * denotes significance at 90%; ** denotes significance at 95%; *** denotes 
significance at 99%. Values noted in bold are statistically significant at the 90% level or 
higher.  Sample: January 1, 2007 – February 19, 2009.   24
Table 3: Response of Emerging Market CDS Spreads to U.S. Events (continued) 
 
Variable  China Korea Malaysia  So.  Africa  Turkey   
C 0.05  -0.3  -0.02  0.2  -0.04 
D(CDS5Y(-1))  0.13*** 0.19***  0.37***  0.29*** 0.27*** 
BR -1.17  -2.54  -3.18*  -2.32  -3.81 
WD  1.80** 5.56***  4.27***  1.54  5.46** 
CRD -0.49  4.88  3.15  0.6  4.23 
FSD  -2.96*** -9.16*  0.01  -27.38*** -22.00*** 
FSE  -66.82*** -183.16***  -106.51***  -46.14***  -73.76*** 
HD  7.04* 15.87*  1.64 10.16  35.26*** 
LEHMAN  7.30*** 25.68***  11.78*** 26.29*** 34.83*** 
POL  10.47** 23.11***  21.90***  9.24 2.66 
REC -0.6  -2.49  -4.20** 4.31*  4.09 
TARP_CANCEL 7.42  26.15**  8.91  95.32*** 34.66** 
TBS 1.97  8.70***  -0.53 0.5  -6.83** 
FBS  3.21**  4.2  5.93***  -3.14 -2.46 
REG 1.791  6.63**  2.77  7.17** 8.84** 
REALPLUS -3.04  -5.99  -2.41  -14.87*** -10.31* 
REALMINUS 0.13  -1.6  0.65  1.95  2.9 
Observations  533  533  533       
Adjusted R-squared  0.24  0.412 0.37 0.28 0.23 
S.E. of regression  5.86  11.32  8.61  11.47  14.43 
Mean depend. Var  0.34  0.54  0.37  0.62  0.46 
Log likelihood  -1690  -2040  -1895  -2048  -2162 
Durbin-Watson stat  1.89 1.83  1.875 2.02  2.1 
Notes:  * denotes significance at 90%; ** denotes significance at 95%; *** denotes significance at 99%. 
Values noted in bold are statistically significant at the 90% level or higher.  For China, Korea and Malaysia: 
all independent variables are lagged one day to take into time differences between U.S. and Asian markets. 
Sample: January 1, 2007 – February 19, 2009. 
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Table 3 (continued):  Response of Emerging Market CDS Spreads to U.S. Events  
Variable 
   Russia    Czech 
Republic 
Hungary Poland 
C     0.38  0.87 0.36 2.00 
D(CDS5Y(-1))     0.34***  0.07  0.27***  0.06 
BR     -4.88  -3.88*  -9.98  -6.28** 
WD     2.11  2.05  21.65** 8.78** 
CRD     -1.76  5.31 16.97 6.00 
FSD     -34.08***  -3.92  -14.62  -17.79*** 
FSE     -66.49***  -22.43*** -69.16*** -43.17*** 
HD     63.40***  13.53**  3.21  6.76 
LEHMAN     38.64***  8.07* 42.45***  12.93** 
POL     -22.41  -16.98***  15.00 4.29 
REC     2.96  -1.83 2.74  1.72 
TARP_CANCEL    158.09***  -5.04  47.72  24.53* 
TBS     -1.04  0.80 -9.97  -2.04 
FBS     -8.00  -2.56 1.82 -0.98 
REG    17.93***  4.19  1.69  1.31 
REALPLUS     -16.37**  -5.07  -10.75  -8.17 
REALMINUS     6.41  3.66 9.96 3.62 
 
Observations     533  180 94 133 
Adjusted R-squared      0.32  0.13 0.29 0.24 
S.E. of regression      20.49  8.51 24.82  11.32 
Mean depend. Var      1.26  0.81 3.11 1.66 
Log likelihood      -2357  -632 -426 -502 
Durbin-Watson stat      2.09  2.11 2.17 2.21 
Notes: Dependent variable: change in CDS spread. * denotes significance at 90%; ** denotes significance at 
95%; *** denotes significance at 99%.Values noted in bold are statistically significant at the 90% level or higher. 
Sample: January 1, 2007 – February 19, 2009 except for Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland where samples 
vary depending on data availability.    26
 
Table 4  Equity Market Linkages During the Three Phases of the Financial Crisis 
    
Correlations 

























    
ARGENTINA  0.64  0.42 0.66 0.24 57% 
BRAZIL  0.73 0.60 0.83 0.23 38% 
CHILE  0.53 0.62 0.64 0.03 4% 
CHINA 0.16  0.23 0.24 0.01 4% 
COLOMBIA 0.32  0.16 0.50 0.34 210% 
CZECH 0.28  0.26 0.38 0.12 45% 
HUNGARY 0.21  0.28 0.50 0.22 78% 
KOREA 0.47  0.39 0.34 -0.05 -13% 
MEXICO  0.72 0.77 0.83 0.06 8% 
MALAYSIA 0.46  0.42 0.40 -0.02 -5% 
POLAND 0.36  0.24 0.49 0.25 103% 
RUSSIA 0.24  0.29 0.29 0.00 0% 
SOAFRICA 0.22  0.39 0.46 0.07 17% 
TURKEY 0.33  0.21 0.44 0.24 115% 
    
Note: Correlations shown are between percent changes in the SP500 and percent  
changes in local currency stock market price indices. Korea, China and Malaysia  
are one-day ahead. 
 
 
Table 5: VAR Lag Order Selection Criteria 
 Lag  LogL  LR  FPE  AIC  SC  HQ 
0  1748.27  NA    6.90e-08  -10.81  -10.79  -10.80 
1  1770.17  43.38   6.18e-08  -10.92   -10.85*  -10.90 
2 1778.39  16.19   6.02e-08  -10.95  -10.83  -10.90 
3  1790.67  24.04    5.72e-08*   -11.00*  -10.84   -10.94* 
4 1792.62  3.79   5.79e-08  -10.99  -10.78  -10.90 
5 1795.54  5.64   5.83e-08  -10.98  -10.72  -10.88 
6 1798.09  4.89   5.88e-08  -10.97  -10.67  -10.85 
7 1804.02  11.32*    5.81e-08  -10.98  -10.63  -10.84 
8 1807.58  6.73   5.83e-08  -10.98  -10.58  -10.82 
9 1809.24  3.14   5.92e-08  -10.97  -10.52  -10.79 
10 1811.55 4.31    5.98e-08 -10.96  -10.47  -10.76 
 * indicates lag order selected by the criterion.  
Endogenous variables: DLOG(SP500INDEX) and DLOG(STOCKINDX_MEXICO), 
Sample: 1/01/2007 to 1/19/2009, Included observations: 323 
 LR: sequential modified LR test statistic (each test at 5% level) 
 FPE: Final prediction error 
 AIC: Akaike information criterion 
 SC: Schwarz information criterion 
 HQ: Hannan-Quinn information criterion 
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Table 6: VAR Granger Causality Tests    
Excluded Chi-sq  df  Prob. 
a. Full Sample (1/07–2/08)     
DLOG(SP500INDEX) 10.572  3  0.014 
      
b.  Phases 1 and 2 (1/07–8/08)    
DLOG(SP500INDEX) 2.221  3  0.528 
      
c. Phase 3 (9/08–2/09)    
DLOG(SP500INDEX) 5.767  3  0.124 
      
Dependent variable: DLOG(STOCKINDX_MEXICO)   
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Note: the two vertical lines mark the dates (May 19, 2008 and September 15, 2008) that 
separate the three phases of the sub-prime crisis.   29
 





































































Note: the two vertical lines mark the dates (May 19, 2008 and September 15, 2008) that 
separate the three phases of the sub-prime crisis. The stock index for the USA is the 
SP500. Stock indices for EM are in local currency values. Indices normalized to unity on 
February 27, 2007.    30




































































Note: the two vertical lines mark the dates (May 19, 2008 and September 15, 2008) that 
separate the three phases of the sub-prime crisis.   31
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Chart 6  VAR Model Impulse Responses (One standard deviation shock) 
 